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The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test is a well-established test of executive function that
evaluates the capacity to abstract, follow, and switch rules. There has been remarkably
little systematic analysis of Brixton test performance in the prototypical neurodegen-
erative disorder of the frontal lobes: behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia
(bvFTD) or evaluation of the test’s ability to distinguish frontal from temporal lobe
degenerative disease. We carried out a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Brixton
performance in 76 patients with bvFTD and 34 with semantic dementia (SD) associated
with temporal lobe degeneration. The groups were matched for demographic variables
and illness duration. The bvFTD group performed significantly more poorly (U = 348,
p < .0001, r = .58), 53% of patients scoring in the poor–impaired range compared with
6% of SD patients. Whereas bvFTD patients showed problems in rule acquisition and
switching, SD patients did not, despite their impaired conceptual knowledge. Error
analysis revealed more frequent perseverative errors in bvFTD, particularly responses
unconnected to the stimulus, as well as random responses. Stimulus-bound errors were
rare. Within the bvFTD group, there was variation in performance profile, which could
not be explained by demographic, neurological, or genetic factors. The findings
demonstrate sensitivity and specificity of the Brixton test in identifying frontal lobe
degenerative disease and highlight the clinical value of qualitative analysis of test
performance. From a theoretical perspective, the findings provide evidence that semantic
knowledge and the capacity to acquire rules are dissociable.Moreover, they exemplify the
separable functional contributions to executive performance.
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Executive impairments resulting from brain disease or injury have a major impact on
functioning in daily life. Tests of executive function therefore play a crucial clinical role.
They also have the potential to inform theoretical understanding of the functions of the
frontal lobes (Robinson et al., 2015; Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Stuss, 2011; Stuss et al.,
2000). The Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1996, 1997) bears
similarities to the traditional Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Milner, 1963; Nelson, 1976;
Stuss et al., 2000) in that it evaluates the ability to acquire and follow rules, to switch
between rules, and to inhibit earlier response patterns. It has good reported validity for
use in clinical populations (Van den Berg, Nys, Brands, & Ruis, 2009), and normative data
are available for both younger and older adults (Bielak, Mansueti, Strauss, & Dixon, 2006;
Burgess & Shallice, 1997; Spitoni et al., 2018; Van den Berg et al., 2009). It has the
practical, clinical advantage of making minimal verbal demands, so is suitable for patients
with communication disorders, poor literacy levels, orwhose first language is not English.
Despite evidence for the test’s sensitivity to focal frontal lesions (Burgess & Shallice,
1996, 1997; Reverberi, D’Agostini, Skrap, & Shallice, 2005), there has been surprisingly
little systematic exploration of Brixton performance in the prototypical bilateral frontal
lobe disease: behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) (Neary et al., 1998;
Rascovsky et al., 2011). BvFTD is a neurodegenerative disorder, with onset typically
between 50 and 70 years, characterized by radical alterations in behaviour. It might be
anticipated that the Brixton test would be highly sensitive to bvFTD. Yet, in a study of 11
bvFTD patients (Hornberger et al., 2010) overall Brixton performance differed only
marginally from that of controls. The test also failed to distinguish bvFTD from a non-
progressive disorder thatmimics bvFTD (Hornberger, Piguet,Kipps,&Hodges, 2008), the
so-called FTD phenocopy syndrome (Kipps, Hodges, Fryer, & Nestor, 2009). Given the
known heterogeneitywithin bvFTD, evaluation of performance in amuch larger cohort is
required.
Aside from the paucity of data relating to test sensitivity, there is currently little
information about the specificity of the Brixton test in identifying frontal lobe
degenerative disease. Comparative studies of bvFTD and Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
reported no difference in Brixton performance in the twopatient groups (Buhl, Stokholm,
& Gade, 2013; Hornberger et al., 2010; Wong, Flanagan, Savage, Hodges, & Hornberger,
2014). AD is not, however, immune from frontal lobe involvement. Semantic dementia
(SD), which is pathologically related to bvFTD, represents a purer comparison.
Semantic dementia is a disorder of conceptual knowledge, associated with prominent
atrophy of the temporal lobes (Hodges & Patterson, 2007; Neary et al., 1998). A salient
feature is difficulty in naming and understanding words, leading to the alternative
designation ‘semantic variant primary progressive aphasia’ (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011).
The conceptual disorder is not, however, confined to language but progressively involves
loss of understanding of information arising from all sensorymodalities. Patients no longer
recognize familiar faces (Josephs et al., 2008; Snowden, Thompson, & Neary, 2004) and
voices (Luzzi et al., 2017) or understand themeaning of common objects (Bozeat, Lambon
Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1994), non-
verbal environmental sounds (Bozeat et al., 2000; Goll et al., 2010), smells (Luzzi et al.,
2007), and tastes (Piwnica-Worms, Omar, Hailstone, & Warren, 2010). A pertinent
question is whether the pervasive, multimodal semantic loss extends to the ability to
identify, understand, and follow rules and to recognize rule shifts. This question has
theoretical importance for understanding the semantic disorder in SD and the nature of
conceptual knowledge. It also has clinical relevance with regard to the specificity of the
Brixton test as an executive test of frontal lobe function.
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The Brixton test is potentially informative because performance can be evaluated
along multiple dimensions. The test comprises 10 numbered circles, one of which is
coloured blue (Figure 1). The participant is required to anticipate the position of the blue
circle on each successive page of a 55-page test booklet by identifying patterns that vary
over the course of the task. The test incorporates nine patterns/rule shifts: three ‘+1’ rules
(e.g., the blue circle moves from position 1 to 2 to 3 to 4), two ‘1’ rules (e.g., it moves
down from 4 to 3 to 2), three alternating rules (it switches respectively between 5 and 10,
4 and 10 and 8 and 9), and one constant rule in which the blue circle remains in the same
position (9 to 9 to 9 to 9). In the standard procedure, performance is measured in terms of
the total number of errors, the higher the score, the poorer the performance. The test also
offers the opportunity to evaluate the effect on performance of the nature of the
underlying rule and, as suggested by Crescentini et al. (2011), to distinguish between
acquisition and maintenance of rules.
The test also readily lends itself to an analysis of the nature of errors. In their original
studies, Burgess and Shallice (1996, 1997) distinguished between (1) perseverations, (2)
plausible errors, based on an earlier or novel but viable rule, and (3) implausible
responses, unrelated to a rule or previous response. The latter error type distinguished
best patients with anterior from those with posterior hemisphere brain lesions with the
anterior lesion group showing more implausible responses. Reverberi, D’Agostini, et al.
(2005) and Reverberi, Lavaroni, Gigli, Skrap, and Shallice (2005) refined the error analysis
further. A motivation was the recognition that responses that fall within the broad rubric
of ‘perseverations’ are not all the same. They might constitute the repetition of the
preceding response or the immediately preceding rule or a return to an earlier rule that is
not the immediately preceding one.
Further distinctions between perseverations might plausibly be made. Consider the
situation of the first rule shift in the Brixton test: the blue circle, having appeared in
consecutive positions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, now, instead of the anticipated position 7, moves back
to position 5, and then consecutively to positions 4, 3, 2, and 1. That is, there is a shift from
an ’+ 1’ to a ’- 1’ rule. A hypothetical patient A, who fails to recognize the rule shift, might
incorrectly select 6 when shown the blue circle in position 5, 5 when it is in position 4, 4
when it is in position 3, and so on. The patient is showing perseveration of the preceding
+1 rule. Patient B, in contrast might, following the rule change, select position 8, then 9,
then 10, despite the blue circle’s respective positions of 5, 4, and 3. Patient B, like patient
Figure 1. Brixton spatial anticipation Test. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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A, is showing perseveration of the preceding +1 rule. The difference is that whereas
patient A’s response for each trial is guided by the position of the blue circle, patient B’s
response is not. Hence, it would be important to distinguish between rule-based
perseverative errors that are dictated by the position of the blue circle and rule-based
perseverations that are dislocated from/independent of the blue circle’s position but are
influenced by the participant’s own preceding response.
A further potentially important distinction, recognized by Burgess and Shallice
(1996), is between logically plausible and implausible (random) incorrect responses.
Consider the sequence 3, 2, 1 (1 rule). Thereafter, the blue circle moves back to
position 10. Yet, selection of position 6 is plausible, on the basis of a putative rule ‘move
one space in an anticlockwise direction’ (see Figure 1). By contrast, selection of position
8 is implausible, since it bears no relationship to any viable rule and thus can be
considered ‘random’.
An additional type of response warrants consideration. Environmentally driven,
stimulus-bound behaviour is a known feature of frontal lobe disease (Besnard et al., 2011;
Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989). It has been reported in bvFTD
(Ghosh & Dutt, 2010; Ghosh, Dutt, Bhargava, & Snowden, 2013) and was included as a
supportive feature in early diagnostic criteria for FTD (Neary et al., 1998). This raises the
possibility of occurrence of ‘stimulus-bound’ error responses, in which the participant’s
response matches the position of the blue circle. The Brixton test includes one constant
rule (9, 9, 9), so for those items, a response identical to the stimulus position is correct, but
responses that match the blue circle’s position might potentially arise erroneously
elsewhere in the test.
The current study compared performance on the Brixton test in a consecutive series of
patients diagnosed with bvFTD or SD. The study had the following principal aims: (1) to
determine the value of theBrixton test in distinguishing between bvFTD and SD, disorders
respectively of the frontal and temporal lobes, (2) to better understand the basis for
impaired performance through systematic exploration of performance characteristics,
and (3) to explore the value of error analysis in distinguishing frontal lobe degenerative
disease. The findings ought to have clinical implications for understanding of bvFTD and




The study group comprised patients referred to a specialist diagnostic unit for early-onset
dementias. The criteria for selection were that the patients (1) had a clinical diagnosis of
bvFTD or SD andmet established criteria for those conditions and (2) they had undergone
neuropsychological evaluation that included the Brixton test.
Patients’ overall functional capacitywas evaluated using the revised Clinical Dementia
Rating (CDR) scale, modified for use in FTD (Knopman, Weintraub, & Pankratz, 2011).
The Mini-Mental State Examination provided a general measure of cognitive functioning.
Background information for patients also included scores on a standard graded difficulty
naming test (Graded Naming Test; McKenna & Warrington, 1980) and a less demanding
locally developednaming test involving 40pictures of highly familiar items (10 animals, 10
fruits/vegetables, 10 articles of clothing, 10 objects) drawn from the Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980) corpus. This undemanding naming test yields ceiling-level
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performance in healthy controls. Aword–picturematching test using those same 40 items
was also included.
One hundred and 10 patients fulfilled the criteria for the study: 76 with bvFTD and 34
with SD. Patients with bvFTD had presented to medical attention with a history of
behavioural change, which included social disinhibition, reduced motivation and lack of
self-care, loss of sympathy and empathy, increased preference for sweet foods, and
repetitive behaviours and stereotypies. All patients fulfilled contemporary criteria for
bvFTD (Rascovsky et al., 2011). Most bvFTD patients were physically well. However, 14
(18%) showed physical signs of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), which is known to co-
occurwith bvFTD in a proportion of patients (Burrell et al., 2016;Neary et al., 1990; Saxon
et al., 2017). Clinical brain imaging reports, available for 66 (87%) of cases, supported the
clinical diagnosis. 55 bvFTDpatients had been screened for geneticmutations linked FTD.
Mutations were detected in 13 (24%): Nine had repeat expansions in the C9orf72 gene,
three in the progranulin gene, and one in the MAPT gene.
The SD patients presented to medical attention with symptoms indicative of semantic
loss: problems inword comprehension andnaming, difficulties in recognition of faces and
objects. All showed temporal lobe atrophy; in 23 cases, this was most marked on the left
side; in nine cases, it was more marked on the right side; and in two cases, there was no
asymmetry of atrophy. All patients met criteria for SD (Neary et al., 1998). Most also
fulfilled criteria for semantic variant of primary progressive aphasia (Gorno-Tempini et al.,
2011), although the patients with right predominant atrophy had face recognition
problems as an early symptom. All patients showed a multimodal disorder of semantic
knowledge at the time of testing. In keeping with evidence that SD has a low familial
incidence (Hodges et al., 2010), no patient had an identifiable genetic mutation.
Brixton tests had been administered by trained neuropsychologistswithmany years of
clinical experience of assessing patients with forms of dementia. If patients had difficulty
with verbal comprehension of test instructions, examiners adopted a visual gestural
technique of pointing to the blue circle and then saying ’where next?’ whilst pointing to
the empty circles and indicating the next page. To circumvent potential problems in
working memory, the examiner repeated the instruction ’where will be the blue one be
next?’ throughout the test.
Patients, or their consultees, provided written consent for clinical data to be used for
research purposes. All patients are classed as ‘vulnerable adults’, demonstrating on
cognitive test impairments in language and/or executive functions that potentially
compromise decision-making capacity. Nevertheless, fundamental principles of the
Mental Capacity Act (2005) are that people, including vulnerable adults, ’have the right to
make their owndecisions’ and ’all practicable helpmust be given to enable them to do so’.
Both the patient and their consultee (normally their spouse) were involved in the consent
process, with information being presented in simplified form to the patient. Most patients
signed their own consent form, whilst carers acted as a safeguard, confirming that the
patient’s agreement was consistent with their likely decision before they became ill.
Procedure
Brixton score sheets were extracted from the patients’ clinic files by one author, and
photocopied, ensuring that all personal and diagnostic identifying information was
erased, and the copies were allocated a unique code. Coding of score sheets was then
carried out, in a blinded fashion, by other assessors without knowledge of the patients or
their diagnoses. A set of Brixton score sheets frompatient groups not included in the study
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were also examined in order to identify ambiguities in scoring of errors and to refine the
system for classification, which occurred through an iterative process.
Quantitative scoring
1. An overall error score was calculated, in accordance with standard test instructions.
2. Performance on the first two trials following a rule shift (reasoning trials) and
subsequent trials (post-reasoning trials) was examined separately. This follows the
distinction made by Crescentini et al. (2011) between rule acquisition, when people
are using reasoning/problem-solving skills to acquire the rule, and rule maintenance,
when it would be expected that the rule would have been learned. It was anticipated
that people with a degenerative dementia might be slower to acquire rules than the
general population, so allowed for two trials, rather than one, for reasoning of the
rule.
3. It was recorded whether or not the patient had successfully acquired each rule,
operationally defined as two consecutive correct responses in post-reasoning trials.
Set 5 (reverse sequence 10, 9, 8) is, however, short,with only 1post-reasoning trial, (3
trials in total), so was omitted from this analysis.
Error analysis
The error classification followed the taxonomy described by Reverberi, D’Agostini, et al.
(2005), Reverberi, Lavaroni, et al. (2005) with modifications and elaboration to allow for
alternative error types that might potentially be applicable to bvFTD. In particular, a
separation was made between rule-based responses that are influenced by the position of
the blue circle (stimulus-related) and those that are not (stimulus-unrelated), as well as
between responses that have no link to an underlying rule (non-rule-based). Error analysis
was based on all trials, reasoning and post-reasoning.
1. Stimulus-related errors
a. Stimulus-bound:Theparticipant responds by pointing to the blue circle. This is not
applicable for set 8, where the correct response is constant (i.e., 9, 9, 9) or trial 49
(see below).
b. Logical Inference: A potentially plausible error response. Instances classifiable as a
logical inference are as follows: (1) Trial 5: response 10 (consistent with putative
‘move in a clockwise direction’ rule); (2) Trial 11: response 6 (consistent with
putative ‘move in an anticlockwise direction’ rule); (3) Trial 20: response 1
(consistent with alternation rule); (4) Trial 27: response 6 (consistent with
‘anticlockwise direction’ rule; (5) Trial 42: response 3 or 10 (consistent with
alternation rule), response 8 (consistent with1 rule); and (6) Trial 49: response 8
(consistent with constant rule).
c. Perseveration of rule type A: Continued application of the rule from the
immediately preceding set OR applied in the immediately preceding incorrect
response. Note that for alternating sets, a repeated switch between adding and
subtracting 1 (e.g., for set 7, responses 5,9,5,9 when shown the blue circle in
positions 4,10,4,10) was classified as perseveration of rule type A after the first
instance of the addition and subtraction.
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d. Same rule: Application of a rule that is not the immediately preceding rule or the
rule applied in the immediately preceding response. Same rule errors apply
regardless of whether or not they were successfully acquired when first exposed.
Shifts back to an earlier rule mid-set, after the patient has achieved the current rule,
constitute same rule diversions.
2. Rule-based, stimulus-unrelated errors
e. Perseveration of response: Repetition of an incorrect response that is identical to
the immediately preceding incorrect response. (e.g., continued production of the
response ‘8’). Note that this error type does not apply to the first instance of the
incorrect response.
f. Perseveration of rule type B: Continued application of an incorrect rule, where
responses relate to the position of the preceding response rather than the position
of the blue circle. The ‘rule’ applied may relate to a previously acquired rule, a
previously exposed rule not acquired, or an idiosyncratic rule.
3. Non-rule-based, non-stimulus-related errors
g. Random responses: Response unrelated to a rule, preceding response, or blue
circle position. Apparently random responses occurring mid-set after a rule has
been achieved are classified as Random diversions.
h. Omissions: No response is given.
Errorsmight feasibly be interpreted inmore than oneway. For example, perseveration
of a preceding response (e.g., 8, 8, 8) in set 9 also constitutes perseveration of the
preceding ‘constant’ rule. In order to deal with such ambiguities and ensure consistency
of classification across the cohort, a flow chart for error classification was developed,
shown in the Appendix.
Statistical analysis
The G* Power program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to perform a
sensitivity power analysis. All other analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics
version 25.
t-Tests were applied for group comparisons where data were normally distributed.
Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d formula (M1M2)/Sp,, where M = group
mean and Sp = pooled standarddeviation. 95%confidence intervalswere calculatedusing
the procedure of Grissom and Kim (2005), described by Fritz, Morris, and Richler (2012).
Non-parametric analyses (Mann–Whitney U-tests and Spearman’s correlations (rs))
were used for Brixton and other cognitive data because of their skewed distribution. The
Bonferroni-adjusted p-values were applied in analyses involving multiple comparisons.
Effect sizes were calculated using the formula r = z/√n.
The chi-squared tests, or Fisher’s exact test where appropriate, were used for
categorical data. Effect sizes were calculated using Cramer’s V: / =√(v2/N), with
bootstrapping to determine 95% confidence intervals (CI).
Results
A sensitivity power analysis, based on a = 0.05, 1  b = 0.80, and group sizes N1 = 76
and N2 = 34, yielded effect size d = 0.53, which corresponds to a medium effect
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according to Cohen’s classification for d (0.2, small; 0.5, medium; and 0.8, large). On this
basis, a smallest effect size of interest for r and /was identified as 0.3, as this corresponds
to a Cohen standard medium effect(0.1, small; 0.3, medium; and 0.5, large).
All Brixton analyses, aside from those relating to genetics, involved the complete
cohortN1 = 76,N2 = 34,whereas therewere somemissing values frombackground data.
Demographics and background cognitive data
The bvFTD and SD groups did not differ in gender distribution, age, duration of illness at
test, CDR, or MMSE scores (Table 1). In most patients in both groups, CDR scores were
consistent with a mild–moderate overall severity of dementia.
In keeping with expectation, there were highly significant differences in naming and
word comprehension scores, superior performance being demonstrated by bvFTD
patients (Table 2). Themedian performance in bvFTD fell within the normal range on the
demanding Graded Naming Test (McKenna &Warrington, 1980) and approached ceiling
level on the less demanding naming test and word–picture matching test. By contrast, SD
patients were severely impaired, with scores on the Graded Naming Test at floor level.
Brixton performance: quantitative analysis
Number of errors
Comparisons between bvFTD and SD revealed the converse pattern to that shown for
naming and comprehension tests. The performance of bvFTD patients, measured by the
total number of errors, was significantly poorer than that of SD patients (Table 2).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of performance in the two patient groups, with
classifications based on scaled scores andpublished test norms (Burgess& Shallice, 1997).
More than half of bvFTD patients (53%) performed in the poor–impaired range,
contrasting with only 6% of SD patients. SD patients showed the converse pattern of
performance: 53% achieved scaled scores of 7 (high average) or above, compared with
only 5% of bvFTD patients. In bvFTD, 34% of patients made more than 31 errors, in
keeping with a scaled score of 1, compared with 3% of SD patients. Performance for
individual patients, shown in Figure 3, illustrates the wide variation in test scores, which
is most marked in bvFTD.
Reasoning versus post-reasoning trials
When responses were separated into reasoning trials, operationally defined as the initial
two responses following a rule shift, and post-reasoning trials, the pattern was the same.
bvFTD patients performed significantly more poorly than SD patients on both reasoning
(U = 535, bonfp < 0.001, r = .47) and post-reasoning trials (U = 388, bonfp < 0.001,
r = .56).
Rule attainment
Table 3 shows the percentage of the two patient groups who attained each rule. A lower
percentage of bvFTDpatients than SD patients acquired rules, irrespective of rule type. In
bvFTD, only on +1 rules did the percentage reach above 75%. By contrast, in SD, the
percentage reached 85% or above for all rules. The rule that bvFTD patients found hardest
to acquire was Rule 7, which involves alternation between positions 10 and 4. Notably,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































170 Sulakshana P. Rao et al.
almost half of bvFTD patients had difficulty acquiring the constant rule (set 8), for which
the correct response is 9 on successive trials.
Brixton test: Item 1 response
There is no correct answer for item 1 of the Brixton test. Nevertheless, the number 2
position is the most plausible and might be anticipated to be the most likely ‘default’
response. 42 of 76 (55%) bvFTD patients selected number 2 as their initial response
compared with 25 of 34 (74%) SD patients. The findings point to a non-significant trend
towards more non-conventional responding in bvFTD (v2(1) = 3.3, p = .07, / = .17, CI:
0.01 to 0.34).
Correct responses occurring by chance
Sporadic correct responses, arising amidst a run of error responses, might be construed as
arising by chance. Such ’correct-by-chance’ responseswere significantlymore common in
Figure 2. Percentage of the patient group performing at the superior–above-average level (scaled score
7–10 according to test norms), average–low average level (scaled score 6–4), and poor–impaired level
(scaled score 3–1).
Table 2. Performance on Naming, Comprehension, and Brixton tests
Test N1/N2 bvFTD SD Mann–Whitney p value Effect size r
Graded Naming/30
median (range)
59/34 15 (3–28) 0 (0–5) U = 10.0 <.0001a .83
Manchester naming/40
median (range)
63/31 38 (19–40) 22 (0–37) U = 112 <.0001a .72
Word–picture match/40
median (range)
57/30 40 (37–40) 38 (18–40) U = 320 <.0001a .62
Brixton total errors/54
Median (range)
76/34 25 (11–52) 13 (8–32) U = 348 <.0001b .58
Brixton scaled score/10
median (range)
76/34 3 (1–7) 7 (1–9) U = 373 <.0001b .58
Note. N1 N2 number of bvFTD (N1) and SD (N2) patients tested.
aPoorer performance in SD.; bPoorer performance in bvFTD.
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the bvFTD group (U = 784.5, p < .0001, r = .39). They occurred in 32 of 76 (43%) bvFTD
patients but only in 1 of 34 (3%) SD patients.
Brixton performance: analysis of errors
Table 4 shows the breakdown of errors in the two groups.
Figure 3. Scatterplots showing Brixton error scores for individual bvFTD and SD patients (maximum
possible error score = 54).
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Stimulus-related errors
Stimulus-bound errors were rare in both groups. Perseverations of rule type A were
numerically more common in bvFTD, although the group difference did not reach
corrected levels of significance. Same rule errors occurred with equal frequency in both
groups. That included diversions to an alternative rule after a rule had been acquired.
Rule-based errors unconnected to the stimulus
Perseverations of a preceding response and perseverations of a rule unconnected to the
stimulus (blue circle)were significant indicators of bvFTD (Table 4). Perseveration of rule
type B errors was exceedingly rare in SD and never constituted the application of an
idiosyncratic rule, not previously exposed.




Median Range Median Range U bonfp value r
Stimulus-related errors (response related to position of blue circle)
Stimulus-bound 0 0–13 0 0–2 1,108 .74 .16
Logical inference 0 0–4 1 0–3 998 .28 .20
Perseveration of rule A 3 0–32 2 0–24 929 .14 .23
Same rule 9 0–16 8 5–15 1,122 1.0 .11
Rule-based stimulus-unrelated errors (response related to previous response not blue
circle)
Perseveration of response 0 0–41 0 0–3 936 .03 .28
Perseveration of rule B 0 0–37 0 0–1 931 .02 .29
Non-rule-based, non-stimulus-related errors
Random response 3 0–48 1.5 0–10 818 .02 .30
Omissions 0 0–19 0 0–1 1,278 1.0 .03
Note. Group comparisons that remain significant when corrected for multiple comparisons are shown in
bold.
Table 3. Percentage of patients who acquired rule
Brixton test condition
% of group







(df = 1) bonfp value Effect size /
95% CI
Lower–upper
1 Add 1 2,3,4 84 91 FExact 1.0 .09 0.09 to 0.24
2 Subtract 1 3,2,1 66 94 9.9 .02 .30 0.16–0.42
3 Alternate 10,5,10 58 97 17.2 <.001 .40 0.28–0.51
4 Add 1 8,9,10 87 100 FExact .24 .21 0.14–0.28
6 Add 1 2,3,4 78 100 9.0 .02 .29 0.20–0.37
7 Alternate 4,10,4 37 88 24.9 <.001 .48 0.32–0.62
8 Constant 9,9,9 58 94 14.4 .001 .36 0.22–0.48
9 Alternate 8,9,8 49 97 23.8 <.001 .47 0.34–0.57
Note. df = degrees of freedom; FExact = Fisher’s exact test; bonfp value = Bonferroni corrected for
multiple comparisons.
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Non-rule-based responses
bvFTD patients producedmore random errors than SD patients. Failures to respondwere
rare and did not distinguish the groups.
Interrelationship between error types
Notwithstanding the significant group differences between bvFTD and SD, there was
substantial variation within the bvFTD cohort. For example, a majority of bvFTD patients
made no rule-based, stimulus-unrelated errors at all (hence the median error score of 0),
yet at the other extreme, such errors dominated patient performance. Table 5 shows the
inter-correlation between error types in bvFTD. There were strong associations between
stimulus-unrelated responses (perseveration of response and perseveration of rule type B)
and random errors. Stimulus-unrelated and random errors showed inverse correlations
with stimulus-related (perseveration of rule type A and same rule) errors. In the SD group,
there were no significant correlations between error types.
Brixton performance in bvFTD: relationship to clinical factors
Brixton performance was impaired in a high proportion of bvFTD patients but not all.
Correlational analyses were carried out with a view to identifying factors influencing
performance.
Total error score
There was no significant correlation between the Brixton total error score in bvFTD and
patients’ age (rs = .09, p = .47) or duration of illness (rs = .01, p = .93). The presence of
ALS did not affect performance (U = 425, p = .90, r = .01), nor did the presence of a
Table 5. Correlation between error types produced in bvFTD
Error type






SB LI P-rul A SR P-resp P-rul B Ran Om
SB – 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.02
LI – 0.07 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.004 0.04
P-rul A – 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.48*** 0.13
SR – 0.31 0.32* 0.20 0.08
P-resp – 0.36** 0.52*** 0.15
P-rul B – 0.46*** 0.04
Ran – 0.07
Om –
Note. Correlations of interest, which are >0.3 and which remain significant when corrected for multiple
comparisons, are shown in bold.
SB = stimulus bound; LI = logical inference; P-rule A = perseveration of rule type A; SR = same rule; P-
resp = perseveration of response; P-RuleB = perseveration of rule type B; Ran = random;Om = omis-
sion.
*bonfp < 0.05;; **bonfp < 0.01;; ***bonfp < 0.001.
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geneticmutation (present in 13 of 55 screened patients;U = 260, p = .79, r = .04). There
was, however, a significant association between Brixton scores and CDR and MMSE
scores. Poorer Brixton performance was associated with more severe CDR (rs = .59,
p < .001) and lowerMMSE scores (rs = .61, p < .001). This contrastswith the finding in
SD of no significant relationship between Brixton errors and either CDR (rs = .27,
p = .13) or MMSE (rs = .29, p = .15) scores.
Error types
In keeping with findings for the total error score, there was no significant relationship
between error subtypes and demographic factors, including illness duration. There were,
however, significant inverse correlations, in bvFTD only, between both CDR and MMSE
scores and the frequency of perseveration of rule type B errors (rs = .49, bonfp < 0001 and
rs = .58, bonfp < .001, respectively). There was a positive correlation between MMSE
scores and the number of logical inference errors (rs = .40, bonfp = .004).
Discussion
The study examined the potential of the Brixton test to distinguish between bvFTD and
SD, neurodegenerative disorders with predominant involvement respectively of the
frontal and the temporal lobes. The study sought also to improve understanding of the
basis for performance failure through systematic analysis of performance characteristics
and nature of errors.
Sensitivity and specificity
The Brixton test elicited striking differences in performance in patients with bvFTD and
SD. More than half of the large bvFTD cohort performed within the poor–impaired range,
according to standardpublished classification (Burgess&Shallice, 1997), contrastingwith
6% of SD patients. Group differences were comparable for both reasoning and post-
reasoning trials, excluding the possibility that bvFTD patients were simply slower to
acquire rules. When bvFTD patients had difficulty shifting to a new rule, then that
difficulty was typically maintained across all trials within a set. Difficulty was, moreover,
apparent across all rule types, albeit with varying magnitude. Performance was
particularly poor for alternating rules, paralleling previous findings in FTD of impairment
in object alternation tasks (Freedman et al., 2013). It was relatively better for the +1 rule,
which is the first rule applied in the test.
The SD patients were matched to the bvFTD patients for gender, age, duration of
symptoms, CDR, and MMSE scores, so that group differences could not be attributed to
demographic factors, stage of illness, or severity of disease. Indeed, the SD patients,
predictably, performed significantly more poorly than the bvFTD patients onmeasures of
naming and word comprehension. The findings suggest that the Brixton test is both
sensitive to bvFTD and has specificity in distinguishing a predominantly ‘frontal’ from a
‘temporal’ lobe neurodegenerative disease. Such a conclusion alignswith findings froman
eye-tracking task in bvFTD and SD using an analogue of the Brixton procedure (Primativo
et al., 2017).
The demonstration of preserved Brixton performance in SD patients is instructive.
Patients with SD exhibit widespread loss of conceptual understanding about the world
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that includes difficulty understanding the meaning of words, objects, and other sensory
stimuli. It is a pertinent question whether the conceptual loss extends to the
understanding of rules governing the movement of a spatial stimulus. On the contrary,
the data point to a striking area of preservation. Overall, SD patients were able to grasp the
nature of the task, despite problems in language comprehension, and they were quick to
identify rules and detect rule shifts. The findings complement those showing other
domains of relative preservation in SD. Patients may display good numerical skills (Crutch
& Warrington, 2002; Papagno, Semenza, & Girelli, 2013), although preservation of
number knowledge is not absolute (Julien, Thompson, Neary, & Snowden, 2008; Luzzi,
Cafazzo, Silvestrini, & Provinciali, 2013). Perhaps of particular relevance, they commonly
enjoy puzzles such as jigsaws (Green & Patterson, 2009) and number games such as
sudoku (Papagno et al., 2013), which involve systematization and logical thought. SD
patients are known to pursue such activities until relatively late in the course of disease.
On a practical level, the findings in SDhighlight the clinical value of an executive test such
as the Brixton that minimizes language demands and hence can be disentangled from
patients’ pervasive difficulty in word semantics.
The striking group differences demonstrated by the current study contrast with earlier
findings that the Brixton test did not distinguish bvFTD from AD (Buhl et al., 2013;
Hornberger et al., 2010;Wong et al., 2014). There are plausible reasonswhy thatmight be
so. Group sizes were small in those earlier studies so might not be representative of the
bvFTD population. AD patients, particularly the elderly, are not immune from executive
impairments (Swanberg, Tractenberg, Mohs, Thal, & Cummings, 2004). Moreover, the
Brixton test makes additional demands on spatial functioning and on working memory,
both of which are commonly affected in AD (Snowden et al., 2007; Stopford, Snowden,
Thompson, &Neary, 2007) but are spared in SD. In the comparative studies of bvFTD and
AD, group comparisons were based on test scores alone. It is reasonable to speculate that
qualitative analysis of errors might have revealed a distinct performance profile in the two
groups. In a study in which performance in bvFTD and AD was compared on the Tower
subtest of theDelis–Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) battery (Delis, Kaplan, &
Kramer, 2001), overall scores did not distinguish bvFTD from AD (Carey et al., 2008). By
contrast, the pattern of errors discriminated the groups: Rule violation errors occurred
significantly more often in bvFTD. Those authors’ findings highlighted the importance of
characterizing component processes of performance failure in the cognitive assessment
of FTD and AD.
Error analysis
The error analysis in the current study elicited differences between bvFTD and SD. In
particular, bvFTDpatientsweremore likely tomakeperseverative and randomerrors. The
group difference in perseverative errors was particularly marked for perseverations of the
preceding response or perseveration of the preceding rule type B, indicating specificity of
these types of perseverative errors for frontal lobe disease. That is, bvFTD, but not SD,
patients had a tendency to become disengaged from the blue circle stimulus. Notably,
same rule errors, which might also be construed as a form of perseveration since they
constitute a shift back to an earlier rule, did not differentiate the groups. The findings
reinforce the view (Reverberi, D’Agostini, et al. (2005), Reverberi, Lavaroni, et al. (2005)
that errors that can broadly be classed as perseverations are not all the same. Indeed,
whilst there was a strong inter-correlation in the bvFTD group between perseverations of
176 Sulakshana P. Rao et al.
a response and perseverations of a rule type B, therewere no, or inverse, correlationswith
perseverations of rule type A and same rule errors.
Perseverations of a response and perseverations of a rule type B were also strongly
associated with random errors. What those three error types have in common is that they
reflect a failure of adherence to task goal: The participant, although required to predict the
position of the blue circle, responds in away that has no bearing on the blue circle at all. By
contrast, same rule and perseveration of rule type A errors, although pointing to failure of
set shifting and rule abstraction, nevertheless provide evidence of attention to the blue
circle and hence regard to task goal. The findings point to a dissociable aspects of
executive performance breakdown in bvFTD.
The finding of a correlation between stimulus-unrelated responses in bvFTD and both
CDR and MMSE scores might reasonably suggest that these errors are a marker of disease
severity. This is a plausible explanation although there is a need for caution in
automatically interpreting them as such. A patient who disregards the constraints
imposed by the Brixton task (i.e., the position of the blue circle) might similarly disregard
task goals in the MMSE. For example, a bvFTD patient when asked for today’s date might
instead give the date of their birthday. Clinically, such errors do indeed occur. They show
thatMMSE performance is coloured by patients’ executive impairments and so should not
be considered an independent marker of disease severity. Similarly, the CDR is not wholly
independent of executive skills. Notably, there was no significant correlation between
stimulus-unrelated errors and disease duration,which is onemarker of stage of illness. The
possibility exists that distinct error profiles reflect not merely severity of disease but also
phenotypic variation within bvFTD.
Responses that are identical to the position to the blue circle were included as a
potential error type on the grounds that stimulus-bound behaviours are an established
feature of frontal lobe disease (Ghosh et al., 2013; Lhermitte, 1983). Interestingly, these
errors were rare and – as noted above – some responses bore no relation to the blue circle
at all. Reinforcing the point, bvFTD showed difficulty acquiring the ‘constant’ rule
whereby the correct response location matched that of the blue circle. Thus, in this
relatively large bvFTD cohort, stimulus-boundedness was not a notable performance
characteristic.
The current study measured separately performance for the first trials following a rule
shift (reasoning trials) and subsequent trials (post-reasoning trials). This differentiation
was drawn from the distinctionmadebyCrescentini et al. (2011) between rule acquisition
and rule following. Those authors showed, in an fMRI study of healthy adults who carried
out a computerized adaptation of the Brixton test, differential regions of activation during
rule acquisition and rule following. In the current study, the distinction between initial
and later trials following a rule shift proved relatively uninformative, presumably by virtue
of the fact that rule acquisition in bvFTD was so poor. For many bvFTD patients, all trials
constituted reasoning or rule acquisition trials.
Clinical significance and ecological validity
The study findings highlight the value of the Brixton test in the assessment of
neurodegenerative disease of the frontal lobes. This conclusion is clinically important.
In recent years, there has been increasing concern regarding the ecological validity of
traditional, clinic-based tests of executive function like the Brixton (Chan, Shum,
Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Manchester, Priestly, & Jackson, 2004; Poletti, Cavallo, &
Adenzato, 2017). A central problem is that traditional tests, by definition, provide
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structure. Precise test instructions and the nature of the test materials constrain
participants’ responses.Moreover, tests are administered in a quiet environment free from
distraction. In consequence, people may perform well, whilst demonstrating consider-
able difficulty dealing with the open-ended and conflicting demands of everyday life.
Recognition of these limitations has led to attempts to develop tasks that better mirror
everyday function (Alderman, Burgess, Knight, & Henman, 2003; Burgess, Alderman,
Forbes, & Costello, 2006; Lamberts, Evans, & Spikman, 2010).
Reports of ecological validity of the Brixton test have been variable. One study of
stroke patients found the test not only to be a sensitivemeasure but also to have ecological
validity for identifying cognitive functional outcomes (Vordenberg, Barrett, Doninger,
Contardo, & Ozoude, 2014). However, other studies of brain-injured people have yielded
only modest ecological validity, when measured against behavioural reports from
informants (Odhuba, van den Broek, & Johns, 2005; Wood & Liossi, 2006). The latter
findings are noteworthy. Nevertheless, they need to be interpreted in context. Executive
tasks do notmeasure a unitary construct (Alexander, Stuss, Picton, Shallice, &Gillingham,
2007; Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, &Wilson, 1998; Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Stuss,
2011; Testa, Bennett, & Ponsford, 2012), and performance on different tasks may
dissociate. A factor analytic study of 19 executive tests in a healthy adult population (Testa
et al., 2012) showed that the Brixton test loaded on to the same factor as the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (Milner, 1963;Nelson, 1976) and the Zoomap subtest of the Behavioural
Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, &
Evans, 1996), which the authors defined as a task analysis factor, involved in problem-
solving and reasoning. Other executive tasks loaded on to separate factors. In keeping
with such fractionation, whereas some patients with frontal lobe lesions perform poorly
on the Brixton test (Telling, Meyer, & Humphreys, 2010), others do not (Kapur et al.,
2009).
Just as components of executive function are dissociable in frontal lobe disease so too
are behavioural changes and executive impairments (Stuss, 2011). In studies of bvFTD,
executive and behavioural measures have shown only modest association and distinct,
and overlapping neural correlates (Gansler, Huey, Pan, Wasserman, & Graffman, 2017).
Evidence that performance on the Brixton test is a poor predictor of behavioural change,
elicited by questionnaire or structured interview,might simply reflect the fact that the two
aremeasuring distinct components of frontal lobe function. Perhaps amore apt marker of
everyday functioning, against which the Brixton test could be evaluated, would be
practical indices of patients’ reasoning, decision-making, and judgement in daily life. In
any event, it is of clinical relevance that despite inherent limitations of clinic-based
executive tests, the Brixton test proved sensitive and informative in the investigation of
bvFTD.
Conclusion
The Brixton test is a valuable clinical tool that effectively distinguishes between bvFTD
and SD, associated respectively with prominent frontal and temporal lobe degeneration.
The study highlights the clinical diagnostic value of qualitative analysis of test
performance. The different error patterns within bvFTD demonstrate the dissociative
nature of different forms of perseveration and reinforce the notion of separable
contributions to executive performance.
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Appendix
Flow chart for error classification
Qu. 1. Is the response identical to the correct answer?
YES ? Score as CORRECT (even if response appears correct by chance)
NO ? Score as ERROR. Go to Qu. 2
Qu. 2.Does the error response bear an identifiable relationship to the position of the blue circle/stimulus?
YES ? It is a STIMULUS-RELATED error. Go to Qu. 3
NO ? Go to Qu. 7
Qu. 3. Is the error response identical to the stimulus?
YES ? It is a Stimulus Bound error
NO ? Go to Qu. 4
Qu. 4. Is the error response a plausible interpretation of current rule? for example, responds 6 after 3,2,1
on basis of putative ’move anticlockwise’ rule
YES ? It is a Logical Inference error
NO ? Go to Qu. 5
Qu. 5. Is the relationship of the response to the stimulus the same as for the preceding set or the
immediately preceding response (or in the case of alternating rules the immediately preceding pair of
responses)?
YES ? It is a Perseveration of Rule – type A error
NO ? Go to Qu. 6
Qu. 6.Does the error constitute a shift to an alternative rule, which is not the immediately preceding one?
YES ? It is a Same Rule error. Go to Qu. 6a
NO ? Go to Qu.7
Qu. 6a.Does the shift to an earlier rule occur within a set for which the correct rule has been acquired?
YES ? It is a Same Rule Diversion
NO ? It is a Same Rule error
Qu. 7.Does the response bear an identifiable relationship to the preceding response?
YES ? It is a RULE-BASED, STIMULUS-UNRELATED error. Go to Qu. 8
NO ? Go to Qu. 10
Qu. 8.Is the response identical to the immediately preceding response?
YES ? It is a Perseveration of Response error
NO ? Go to Qu. 9
Qu. 9.Is the relationship of the response to the preceding response consistent with an identifiable rule?
(This may an earlier rule, acquired or not acquired, or an idiosyncratic rule)
YES ? It is a Perseveration of Rule –type B error
NO ? Go to Qu. 10
Qu. 10. Is the response unrelated to an identifiable rule?
YES ? It is aNON-RULE BASED error. Go to Qu. 11
Continued
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NO ? Re-check earlier questions
Qu. 11.Does the response appear arbitrary?
YES ? It is a Random error. Go to Qu.11a
NO ? Go to Qu.12
Qu.11a ? Does the random response occur within a set for which the correct rule has been acquired?
YES ? It is a Random Diversion error
NO ? It is a Random error
Qu. 12. Is the response for the trial missing?
YES ? It is anOmission error
NO ? Re-check earlier questions
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